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Th e Relevant-Irrelevant (RI) has been used as a polygraph screening technique by 
several decades longer than any other. It has demonstrated practical value in prompt-
1 Th is is the third in a series of research articles on the RI screening test. Th e authors would like to express 
appreciation to the following examiners for participating in this study: Gus Trevino, Derick Walker, Timo-
thy Upright, Daniel Scheel, Jerry Lesikar, Bill Horton, Steven Davis, Eddie Hutchinson, Dana Wickland, 
Leo Perez, and Eduardo Garza. We also are grateful to Mark Handler for his helpful suggestions to an 
earlier version of this paper. Th e fi rst author is a Past President of the American Polygraph Association, and 
author of the Elsevier textbook Fundamentals of Polygraph Practice. Th e second author is President of the 
American Polygraph Association, and contributing author to past articles in this publication. Th e views 
expressed are the authors’ own, and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Defense, US 
Government, or the Texas Department of Public Safety. Comments can be sent to Krapohld@gmail.com.
DOI: 10.1515/ep-2015-0007
??????????????????? ??????????????
ing self-report from applicants and employees of behaviours of interest to employers. 
Th e RI has certain strengths that have made it an attractive alternative (Krapohl & 
Shaw 2015). With no comparison questions, the RI is not subject to criticisms that 
the examiner must manipulate the examinee in some fashion to make the technique 
eff ective, as probable-lie comparison question techniques may. It is more fl exible 
than most other methods, accommodating from two to fi ve relevant questions in 
a single test series. Th e RI may also be more resistant to countermeasures, at least of 
the type in which examinees induce reactions to comparison questions. 
Th ese advantages have kept the RI in widespread practice well after the development 
and validation of other polygraph screening techniques. However, the existence of 
these other techniques has brought about comparisons that have not always favoured 
the RI. For example, the RI does not seem to be amenable to any eff ective form of 
manual scoring, a standard for every other screening technique. As such, interpreta-
tion of RI data is far more susceptible to individual diff erences among evaluators. 
Lenient evaluators can make conclusions highly diff erent from those of conservative 
evaluators because decisions are based on global impressions of the data, impressions 
that resist quantifi cation. Th is was recently demonstrated in a compelling manner 
in a study where pairs of four experienced polygraph examiners produced opposite 
opinions in 51 of 100 fi eld RI cases (Krapohl & Rosales 2014). 
Another challenge to the RI has been in the fi nding that its decision accuracy does 
not compete well against other techniques: Other validated screening techniques 
have shown higher decision accuracy. Th is should not be entirely surprising given 
that a test’s reliability sets the limit for its validity, and the RI’s unimpressive reli-
ability should naturally translate to a lower accuracy. To determine whether RI could 
possibly achieve accuracy comparable to other screening techniques, it seems reason-
able as a fi rst step to try and resolve RI’s reliability problem. Th is would require some 
form of data quantifi cation.
Past eff orts to develop a manual scoring system for RI charts have not produced satis-
factory results (Ansley & Weir 1976, Krapohl, Senter & Stern 2005). With comput-
er polygraphs now standard across the profession, an obvious alternative to manual 
scoring could be the use of an automated algorithm. How automated analysis might 
improve reliability is self-evident: software analyses the data the same way each time, 
and is unaff ected by human foibles such as bias, mood, attitudes, fatigue, limited 
experience, and/or poor training. Algorithms are far more reliable than humans in 
managing complex data needed to form decisions. It seems reasonable, therefore, 
that an algorithmic approach could increase reliability of data interpretation, and 
set the stage for potentially greater decision accuracy. a prototype of an RI algorithm 
?????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???
was developed in the early 2000s (Harris & McQuarrie ca 2001). Its unpublished 
preliminary results were promising, but the algorithm was never subject of an inde-
pendent assessment, nor was it released to the fi eld. Its infl uence on decision-making 
was, therefore, untested.
Algorithms are not without shortcomings. What polygraph algorithms may do less 
well is identifi cation of artefacts and assessment of stability in the data, an area where 
humans may have an advantage. Humans are fairly profi cient at pattern recognition, 
a skill helpful in establishing context for the assessment of individual responses, and 
they can adjust their decision process accordingly. Humans may also be better at de-
tecting idiosyncratic tell-tale patterns for individual examinees in a way that allows 
a more informed decision than would arise from a strictly statistical one based on 
group averages. 
Based on the unique and disparate capabilities of humans and machines, it is our 
hypothesis that the combination of human evaluation and algorithmic analysis may 
improve decision accuracy and interrater reliability for the RI over either human 
or machine alone. Th ere is no published evidence to suggest whether this is a valid 
hypothesis, as the polygraph literature is totally silent on human-machine decision 
making. Our expectation of better accuracy using human-machine collaboration is 
based on fi ndings from a totally diff erent fi eld, that of weather prediction. 
Weather forecasting is heavily relied on in a range of endeavours such as agriculture, 
travel, construction, civil defence, and others. Consequently, a great deal of attention 
and funding, has been directed toward developing and assessing weather models, and 
the place for human decision-making in the overall process. For example, a study of 
the combination of statistical decision-making with human refi nement in weather 
prediction was undertaken by Carter and Polger (1986). In their 20-year assess-
ment of historical weather data, Carter and Polger found that the most accurate 
prediction of weather events came when forecasters modifi ed the statistical predic-
tion with factors they knew were infl uenced by their locality. Th e National Weather 
Service models provided the larger framework, and meteorologists’ personal experi-
ence and knowledge modifi ed those predictions to produce the highest accuracy for 
their regions of the country. In his book Th e Signal and the Noise (2012), Nate Silver 
noted that the contribution of human input to computer weather forecasts has been 
relatively fl at at about 25% for precipitation and 10% for temperature, even as fore-
casting and computer modelling has improved substantially over the decades. Th e 
weather modelling literature makes a strong case in that domain that human adjust-
ments of statistical predictions are better than either method alone. 
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Polygraph decision-making, like weather prediction, is a combination of statistical 
averages and local variations. In other words, polygraph examiners apply standard-
ised scoring methods to their data, but may consider factors concerning each indi-
vidual that may adjust their decisions. As an example, if the polygraph data indicate 
deception, but an examiner observes that his examinee has become emotionally dis-
traught during testing, a statistical decision of deception may be suspended. Exam-
iners may also informally or unconsciously consider extra-polygraphic information, 
adjusting their scores in the direction they judge most likely correct (Elaad, Ginton, 
& Ben-Shakhar 1994), which can move decisions to or from inconclusive when the 
physiological data are ambiguous. Barland (1988) also suggests that an examiner’s 
knowledge and appreciation of base rates may make them more cautious in ascribing 
deceptive intent when base rates are low. 
Th ough the polygraph literature shows some research that compares human decision 
accuracy against that of an algorithm (Blackwell 1999, Krapohl & McManus 1999) 
we did not fi nd any on the infl uence of algorithm outputs on the validity and reli-
ability of human polygraph decisions. Moreover, the literature is completely silent 
on the melding together of human and statistical assessments to form polygraph 
decisions. Our two research questions were therefore straightforward: what is the 
infl uence of algorithmic results on human decision-making, and; can validity and 
reliability be improved by integrating human and algorithmic results to form a sin-
gle polygraph result? We took advantage of access to skilled polygraph examiners in 
a large state agency, a substantial archive of verifi ed fi eld RI screening cases, and the 
results of a prototype RI algorithm to test these questions.
??????
Cases
In the late 1990s, the US government sponsored a research study on the RI screening 
test using job applicants for security positions at a large metropolitan airport. Confi r-
mation of ground truth was established by record checks and urinalysis. Th ere were 
four relevant topics covered in those cases: convictions or fi nes for traffi  c violations 
in the State of Georgia in the previous seven years, having been granted bankruptcy 
in the previous seven years in the State of Georgia, having used marijuana in the 
previous 30 days, and having been convicted of a  felony in the State of Georgia. 
a description of the original RI research study that produced this archive of cases can 
be found in Krapohl, Senter, and Stern (2005), and is not recounted here.
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We randomly chose electronic polygraph charts of 50 confi rmed deceptive cases in 
which the examinee had been deceptive solely to the question regarding marijuana 
use, and another 50 from cases in which the examinees had been truthful to all of 
the relevant questions. Th e rationale for this sampling approach was fully explained 
in Krapohl and Rosales (2014), but in brief, it was based on minimum criteria for 
the quantity and fi delity of the data. Th e use of cases where there was deception only 
to a single question was based on earlier fi ndings from Krapohl, Senter, and Stern 
(2005) that decision accuracy was higher when there were multiple deceptions in 
a single case, but that multiple-deceptions represented a small minority of all cases. 
We concluded that the use of cases with multiple deceptions in the sample would 
limit generalisability of the results, and we eliminated those cases. Th ere was no at-
tempt to exclude single-deception cases that had been selected in previous studies.
All cases had three charts and at least four presentations of each of the four relevant 
questions. In the original fi le some cases had four charts, the last being called a “clear-
ing chart.” Clearing charts are used in cases where the testing examiner determined 
that there were indications of deception on a question in the fi rst three charts, and 
the examiner used the fourth chart solely to “clear” the remaining questions. Because 
the presence or absence of a clearing chart would indicate the opinion of the original 
examiner, those charts were not made available to the blind scorers in this study. As 
a result, all scorers saw only the fi rst three charts of each RI case.
Th e physiological data were converted to PDFs, with one fi le per case, and randomly 
numbered from 1 to 100 for the fi rst phase of the study, and re-randomised and 
numbered from 101 to 200 for the second phase. 
Blind Evaluators
Th ere were 11 volunteer evaluators from the Texas Department of Public Safety. All 
held polygraph licenses in the State of Texas. Th eir average fi eld experience was 6.1 
years (ranging from 1 to 20), and their average annual polygraph-related training was 
82 hours. All had received training in RI screening techniques and global test data 
analysis. Four of the examiners had experience conducting RI cases in the fi eld. Th e 
examiners all averaged 12 screening examinations in the fi eld per month and all of 
these examinations were vetted through a 100 percent quality assurance programme. 
Algorithm
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory developed the prototype algo-
rithm using the cases collected in the RI project (Harris & McQuarrie ca 2001.) Th e 
features used in the algorithm relied on derivatives and weighting of reordered data 
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points for which it would be diffi  cult or impossible to map to traditional physiologi-
cal features (e.g., the absolute derivative of reordered abdominal respiration data 
between the Xth and XXth percentile in time window X to XX seconds and a pro-
portionate weighting of X%). Th e details of the algorithm features are beyond the 
scope of this project, and the algorithm itself is proprietary, so the features will not be 
described further. Decision accuracy of that algorithm in a previous study indicated 
a mean of 73% for cases that included single and multiple deceptions (Krapohl, 
Senter & Stern 2005). 
Th e prototype RI algorithm was run against all the 100 cases, and the results were 
recorded in a spreadsheet. Artefact management was handled by the algorithm, with 
the fi rst author making corrections only for erroneous question labels. Th e algorithm 
results for each case were provided to the blind evaluators only in the second phase 
of the study. a decision was reached to consider probabilities of deception rendered 
by the algorithm as lower than 0.30 as No Signifi cant Responses (NSR), while those 
above 0.70 were called Signifi cant Responses (SR). All the others were called No 
Opinion (NO).
Data Analysis
Some blind evaluators reported decisions of Deception Indicated (DI), No Decep-
tion Indicated (NDI), and Inconclusive, while others used the equivalent labels 
used in screening, which are Signifi cant Reactions (SR), No Signifi cant Reactions 
(NSR) and No Opinion (NO). To permit easier comparison to earlier RI studies 
with these cases, the decisions are reported here as SR, NSR, and NO, respectively, 
to be consistent with the labelling convention used in Krapohl and Rosales (2014), 
and Krapohl, Senter, and Stern (2005). 
A spreadsheet was constructed in Microsoft Excel®, and the decisions were recorded. 
Decisions were coded as -1 for SR, +1 for NSR, and 0 for NO. 
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Th e study was conducted in two phases. In Phase 1, examiners were told to evaluate 
individually the RI charts using global analysis in the manner they were accustomed, 
and to record their decisions2 on a data sheet. Th e examiners were instructed to make 
decisions by case, not by individual test question. Examiners were not informed of 
2 Th e RI is typically the fi rst in a multi-step screening process, wherein all reactions to RI test questions 
are resolved by further interviewing and more focused testing. Decisions of SR or NO are not appropri-
ate to RI screening alone, but the labels have been used here for convenience.
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ground truth or of the test questions. Th ey were asked to work independently, and – 
to avoid sharing their opinions about the cases with other evaluators – they were also 
given 30 days to complete the task, with extensions if requested. Examiner instruc-
tions are found in Appendix A.
Th ree months after the receipt of all results from the blind evaluators, the procedure 
was repeated as Phase 2. In that iteration the fi le numbers were re-randomised and 
re-labelled, and the algorithm results were posted on the fi rst page of the PDFs with 
the physiological data. Examiners received the same instructions as in the fi rst phase, 
with an extra paragraph added in the instructions that read:
Please review the PolyScore results on the fi rst page of the PDF of each case. Previous 
research has found this algorithm performs as well as a competent examiner in blind 
evaluation of RI charts. You are not obligated to use the algorithm results, but only 
to consider them in formulating your own opinion. 
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Phase 1: Global Analysis
Table 1 lists the average accuracies for the 11 blind evaluators of the 100 RI cases 
using global analysis. Average decision accuracy was 74.4% for deceptive cases, and 
52.7% for truthful cases, for an overall average of 63.6%. Decision accuracy for de-
ceptive cases was signifi cantly greater than chance (z = 2.51, p < 0.05), but not for 
truthful cases (z = 0.27, ns). When No Opinion decisions were excluded, overall de-
cision accuracy was 66.9%, which was also signifi cant greater than chance (z = 2.86, 
p < 0.05). Collectively, the 11 examiners had a higher decision accuracy for deceptive 
cases than for truthful cases (z = 2.25, p < 0.05). 
Table 1. Average percentages of correct, incorrect, and No Opinion (NO) decisions 
by ground truth, with and without NO decisions, for 11 blind evaluators of 50 de-
ceptive and 50 truthful RI cases.
Deceptive Truthful Overall w/o NO
Correct 74.4 52.7 63.6 66.9
Incorrect 23.5 39.5 31.5 33.1
Inconclusive 2.2 7.8 5.0
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Table 2 shows the proportion of agreement between each evaluator’s decisions and 
ground truth, and between each pair of evaluators. Interrater agreement ranged from 
42.0% to 80.0%, with a mean of 60.8%. Only 4 of 55 paired agreements did not ex-
ceed chance expectancy. Th ere was unanimous agreement among all evaluators in 11 
of the 100 cases, and of those, 10 were decisions of deceptiveness. Only one of those 
unanimous decisions was in error, a false positive. Of the 50 deceptive cases there 
were 38 in which at least one evaluator made a decision that opposed (NSR against 
SR, or SR against NSR) that of the remaining 10 evaluators. In the 50 truthful cases, 
48 had at least one opposite decision among the evaluators.
In Phase 1, the evaluators did not have access to the RI algorithm. However, the 
algorithm’s decisions were compared to their Phase 1 decisions to provide a bench-
mark for the degree of infl uence the algorithm would have when the evaluators 
were exposed to its decisions in Phase 2. Overall average agreement between the 
individual evaluator decisions and the algorithm decisions was 59.9%. For deceptive 
cases the average was 64.8%, and 54.0% for truthful cases.
Table 2. Percentage of agreement for decisions on 100 RI cases between ground truth 
and each examiner, and between pairs of examiners. All percentages were greater 
than chance (p<0.05) except those marked *. Chance agreement = 33.3%.
Examiner
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Ground Truth 73 64 64 58 62 59 55 60 62 81 61
Examiner 1   60 68 62 68 60 64 62 63 80 64
Examiner 2   68 43* 68 67 67 59 61 62 70
Examiner 3   49 73 68 71 46* 65 61 69
Examiner 4   44* 38* 42* 62 57 64 50
Examiner 5   68 64 56 63 70 58
Examiner 6   60 51 62 55 65
Examiner 7   52 58 62 62
Examiner 8   57 64 49
Examiner 9   67 63
Examiner 10   63
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For the entire 100-case sample the average SR rate was 56.9%, 38.1% NSR, and 
5.0% NO. Th e rate at which the 11 evaluators made SR, NSR, and No Opinion 
decisions varied substantially (See: Table 3). With a base rate of 50 deceptive cases for 
the 100-case sample, evaluators made from 25 to 78 decisions of SR. With the same 
base rate of truthful cases evaluators made from 22 to 67 NSR decisions. Evaluators 
made No Opinion decisions in 0% to 13% of the 100 cases. 
Table 3. Number of SR, NSR, and No Opinion decisions of the 11 evaluators of 
100 RI cases.
Examiner
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
SR Decision 52 78 66 25 72 71 61 47 52 46 56
NSR Decision 47 22 34 67 26 23 32 45 35 53 35
NO Decision 1 0 0 8 2 6 7 8 13 1 9
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Decision accuracy in Phase 1 of this study (63.6%) corresponded well with the fi nd-
ings of Krapohl and Rosales (2014) of 59.3%, and a reanalysis of Krapohl, Senter, 
and Stern (2006) of single-deception RI cases showing 63.0% decision accuracy. 
Similarly, the average proportion of paired agreement among evaluators in Phase 1 
of 60.8% was highly similar to that of Krapohl and Rosales (2014) at 59.7%. Th ese 
comparable fi ndings across diff erent data sets using diff erent scorers point to lacklus-
tre performance of global evaluation when it is used alone in RI cases. 
Phase 2: Global Analysis + Algorithm
Table 4 lists the average accuracies for the blind evaluators when they had access to 
algorithm results when conducting their global assessment of the 100 RI cases. Aver-
age decision accuracy was 72.5% for deceptive cases, and 60.7% for truthful cases, 
for an overall average of 66.6% that was signifi cantly greater than chance (z = 2.38, 
p < 0.05). As was found in Phase 1, decision accuracy for deceptive cases was signifi -
cant (z = 3.27, p < 0.05), but it was not so for truthful cases (z = 1.52, ns). When No 
Opinion decisions were excluded, overall decision accuracy was 75.3%, which was 
also signifi cantly greater than chance (z = 4.98, p < 0.05). Th ere was no diff erence in 
accuracy between truthful and deceptive cases (z = 1.77, ns). 
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Table 4. Average percentages of correct, incorrect, and No Opinion (NO) decisions 
by ground truth, with and without NO decisions, for 11 blind evaluators with access 
to algorithm results of 50 deceptive and 50 truthful RI cases.
Deceptive Truthful Overall w/o NO
Correct 72.5 60.7 66.6 75.3
Incorrect 18.4 25.2 21.8 24.7
Inconclusive 9.1 14.0 11.5
By way of comparison, for deceptive cases the algorithm results were 68% correct, 
incorrect for 16%, and NO for 16%. For truthful cases algorithm results were correct 
for 72%, incorrect for 14%, and NO in 14% cases. Detection of deceptive (z = 2.91, 
p < 0.05) and truthful cases (z = 3.19, p < 0.05) were above chance, and there was 
no diff erence in detection rates between the two types of cases (z = 0.62, ns). Overall 
correct decisions were 70% with NOs included, and 82.3% without NOs.
Th e percentages of agreement between each evaluator’s decisions and ground truth, 
and between each pair of evaluators is listed in Table 5. Interrater agreement ranged 
from 44.0% to 88.0%, with a mean of 64.6%. All but one paired-agreements did 
not exceed chance expectancy. Th ere was unanimous agreement among all evaluators 
in 18 of the 100 cases, and of those, 15 were decisions of deceptiveness, three for 
truthfulness. All unanimous decisions were correct. Of the 50 deceptive cases there 
were 29 in which at least one evaluator made a decision opposite (NSR vs. SR, either 
way) to the remaining 10 evaluators. For the 50 truthful cases, 39 had at least one 
opposite decision among the evaluators.
Overall average agreement between individual evaluator decisions and the algorithm 
decisions was 66.6% (z = 4.71, p < 0.05). Th e average was 72.5% for deceptive cases 
(z = 4.02, p < 0.05), and 60.7% for truthful cases (z = 2.74, p < 0.05).
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Table 5. Percentage of agreement for decisions on 100 RI cases between ground truth 
and each examiner, and between pairs of examiners. All percentages were greater 
than chance (p < 0.05) except that marked *. Chance agreement = 33.3%.
Examiner
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Ground Truth 71 68 72 63 66 61 64 64 68 73 63
Examiner 1 67 67 68 55 50 63 66 70 64 63
Examiner 2 66 74 64 56 70 75 80 61 88
Examiner 3 62 67 66 64 60 62 72 67
Examiner 4 52 44* 65 65 69 62 71
Examiner 5 67 56 54 66 69 61
Examiner 6 57 54 56 66 58
Examiner 7 66 67 66 69
Examiner 8 71 59 72
Examiner 9 61 79
Examiner 10                     63
In Phase 2, the average SR rate was 48.9%, 39.5% NSR, and 11.5% NO. Th e rate 
at which the 11 evaluators made SR, NSR, and No Opinion decisions is listed in 
Table 6. Among the 50 deceptive cases, evaluators made from 30 to 70 decisions of 
SR, and from 24 to 63 NSR decisions. Evaluators made No Opinion decisions in 
0% to 20% of the 100 cases. 
Table 6. Number of SR, NSR, and No Opinion decisions for 100 RI cases by 11 
evaluators who viewed algorithm results.
Examiner
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
SR Decision 37 45 54 30 70 68 43 43 48 56 44
NSR Decision 63 40 44 48 24 18 37 47 37 38 39
NO Decision 0 15 2 22 6 14 20 10 15 6 17
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A comparison of Phase 1 and Phase 2 data hints of increases in decision accuracy 
(63.6% vs 66.6%, respectively) and interrater agreement (60.8% vs 64.6%, respec-
tively), but the diff erences proved to be statistically insignifi cant. Given that the al-
??????????????????? ??????????????
gorithm accuracy was higher than examiner decisions that considered the algorithm 
results suggested the use of automated analysis as decision support may not be its 
best role in the decision process.
Post Hoc: Algorithm + Examiner
By itself, the algorithm had a decision accuracy higher than the average accuracy of 
humans even when they had access to the algorithm decisions. We then considered 
whether a two-step process, wherein the algorithm would be aff orded the fi rst assess-
ment of the data would off er a better approach, and only in cases where the algo-
rithm was unable to decide, the decision would be submitted to evaluation by the 
examiners. Fortunately, this hypothesis could be successfully tested with the existing 
data. 
We substituted algorithm decisions for those of the examiners in Phase 1, where the 
examiner had not seen the algorithm results. In cases where the algorithm had pro-
duced inconclusive results, the examiners’ global evaluations were retained. While 
this approach to decision making would be expected to improve interrater agree-
ment, inasmuch as all but the 15 inconclusive algorithm decisions would be identi-
cal, whether decision accuracy would show a benefi t was an open question.
???????
Th e Algorithm + Examiner (A+E) decision rules boosted overall accuracy, the im-
provement coming almost exclusively from the correct identifi cation of truthful cas-
es. a reduction of overall error rates fell short of signifi cance. Th e eff ect of the A+E 
decision rules had no eff ect on deceptive cases. Pair agreement increased, and there 
was a signifi cant reduction in opposite results arising from among pairs of scorers. 
See Table 7.
As Table 7 shows, decision accuracy for the A+E method was signifi cantly higher 
than the results by examiners alone. Virtually all of the benefi t came from the higher 
accuracy with truthful cases. Th ere were signifi cant improvements in reliability and 
opposite decisions as well.
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Table 7. Decision accuracy, interrater reliability, and statistical probabilities of the 
diff erences for two decision processes for 11 scorers of 100 RI screening cases. 
Original 
Examiner 
Decisions (%)
Decisions 
of A+E (%)
Diff 
p
Overall    
Correct 63.5 79.5 <0.01
Error 32.5 19.5 0.051
No Opinion 5.0 1.0 0.10
Deceptive Cases    
Correct 74.4 79.8 0.36
Error 23.5 19.8 0.52
No Opinion 2.2 0.4 0.26
Truthful Cases    
Correct 52.7 79.1 <0.001
Error 39.5 19.3 <0.01
No Opinion 7.8 1.6 <0.05
Reliability    
Paired Agreement 60.4 93.0 <0.001
Opposite Decisions 29.8 6.4 <0.001
   
To determine whether these fi ndings would generalise to a new sample, we reana-
lysed the decisions of four experienced examiners for 100 RI screening cases in a pre-
vious RI study (Krapohl and Rosales, 2012) using the steps described earlier. Table 8 
compares the original decisions with those of the new method. Th ere was an increase 
in overall correct decisions with the A+E method, but it did not achieve statistical 
signifi cance. Again, most of the improvement appears to be attributable to the better 
discrimination of truthful cases. Th ere was, however, a signifi cant diff erence for er-
rors with deceptive cases, where the original examiner’s errors were lower than those 
of the A+E method. 
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Table 8. Decision accuracy, interrater reliability, and statistical signifi cance of the 
diff erences for two decision processes using examiner decisions from Krapohl and 
Rosales (2012). 
Original 
Examiner 
Decisions (%)
Decisions 
of A+E (%)
Diff 
p
Overall  
Correct 59.3 72.0 0.06
Error 32.5 26.8 0.38
No Opinion 8.3 1.3 <0.02
Deceptive Cases    
Correct 81.5 74.0 0.20
Error 12.0 25.5 <0.01
No Opinion 6.5 1.3 0.06
Truthful Cases    
Correct 37.0 70.0 <0.001
Error 53.0 28.0 <0.001
No Opinion 10.0 2.0 <0.02
Reliability    
Paired Agreement 60.5 94.3 <0.001
Opposite Decisions 24.7 3.5 <0.001
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Th e fi ndings from the reanalysis of the Krapohl and Rosales (2012) data from four 
examiners are largely in accord with those from the fi rst sample from 11 examiners 
(Table 7). Both data sets show marked benefi ts of the A+E method for interrater 
agreement and a reduction in opposite decisions. Th ey also share a common fi nding 
that the benefi t is loaded on the detection of truthful cases. 
Where they most noticeably diff er is in the error rate for deceptive cases. As far as 
the decisions of the examiners in Phase 1 of this study (Table 7) are concerned, there 
was a non-signifi cant reduction in false negative errors for those cases when the A+E 
rules were imposed, whereas there was a  statistically signifi cant increase when the 
same A+E rules were used with the Krapohl and Rosales (2012) examiners (Table 8). 
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Because screening tests, as the fi rst step in the successive hurdles approach, must be 
sensitive to deceptiveness this diff erence warrants attention.
A possible explanation lies in diff erences among the groups of examiners used in the 
present study and those in the Krapohl and Rosales (2012) research. Th e present 
group of 11 examiners came from a state agency in which the RI screening test is 
taught, but not often used. In contrast, the four Krapohl and Rosales (2012) exam-
iners were federal examiners with substantial fi eld experience with the RI screening 
test, and had at one time all worked for the same federal agency using this method. 
Th e diff erence in experience could be off ered as a possible source of the disparate 
performance with deceptive cases.
Th e evidence of such an experience diff erence between the sample groups is not 
straightforward, however. When Tables 7 and 8 are compared they show that both 
groups had highly similar overall decision accuracy, proportions of paired agreement, 
and rates of opposite decisions. It would be diffi  cult to discern which group was the 
more experienced based solely on their overall performance data. 
Another explanation may be that one group had a bias in decision-making that would 
be manifested in the types of errors the group made. For example, if one group of 
examiners had a bias away from certain kinds of decisions, and the A+E method did 
not, going from one method to the other could shift the kinds of errors made. In reas-
sessing the Krapohl and Rosales (2012) data, it appears their lower rate of errors with 
deceptive cases may be attributable in part to a general reluctance of those examiners 
to render NSR decisions. Clearly, if examiners avoid NSR decisions, false positive er-
rors should occur less often. a comparison of average NSR rates from the Krapohl and 
Rosales (2012) group to those of the examiners in Phase 1 of the present study found 
signifi cantly fewer NSR decisions (z = 2.14, p < 0.05) among the former group, as 
well as fewer NSR decisions than reached by the algorithm (z = 4.20, p < 0.01). Th ree 
out of the four examiners in the Krapohl and Rosales (2012) group had decision ac-
curacy statistically lower than chance with truthful cases. With the algorithm having 
a dominant eff ect on decisions in the A+E arrangement, and lacking the bias, it might 
be anticipated that the Krapohl and Rosales (2012) examiners would have fewer false 
positive errors without the A+E rules than with them. Th is may account for the higher 
false positive error rate in the A+E arrangement versus the decisions of the examiners 
in the Krapohl and Rosales (2012) study, an eff ect not observed among the decisions 
of the 11 examiners in Phase 1. Th ese fi ndings merit future research.
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We found that allowing examiners to make decisions on the RI screening data only 
when the algorithm produced inconclusive results produced marked improvements 
in interrater reliability and detection of truthfulness, and a  reduction in opposite 
decisions among examiners. In one comparison we found the A+E method increased 
overall decision accuracy. In the cross validation sample the improvement missed sig-
nifi cance. Th e types of errors introduced by the A+E method may be diff erent from 
those examiners make on their own, though overall error rates are similar. Because 
the algorithm used in this study is not generally available, our accuracy fi ndings in 
the A+E arrangement are not expected to represent those of the RI screening test as 
currently practiced in the fi eld. Th e converging evidence for decision accuracy for the 
RI screening test using only global analysis is about 62%, with a similar proportion 
of agreement among independent examiners. Figure 1 summarises the reliability and 
accuracy fi ndings of the decision data collected in this study.
Fig. 1. Summary graph of the three approaches in this study for analysis of RI poly-
graph charts.
?????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???
??????????
Ansley N., Weir R. (1976): a numerical scoring system for Relevant-Irrelevant poly-
graph tests. Paper presented at the 1976 Annual Seminar of the American Polygraph 
Association. 
Barland G.H. (1988): Th e polygraph test in the USA and elsewhere. In A. Gale (Ed.) 
Th e polygraph test: Lies, truth and science. Sage Publications, London.
Blackwell N.J. (1999): Polyscore 3.3 and psychophysiological detection of deception 
examiner rates of accuracy when scoring examinations from actual criminal investi-
gations. Polygraph 28 (2), 149–175.
Carter G., Polger P. (1986): a 20-year summary of National Weather Service verifi ca-
tion results for temperature and precipitation. Technical Memorandum NWS FCST 
31. Washington DC, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
Elaad E., Ginton A., Ben-Shakhar G. (1994): Th e eff ects of prior expectations and 
outcome knowledge on polygraph examiners’ decisions. Journal of Behavioral Deci-
sion Making, 7 (4), 279–292.
Harris J.C., McQuarrie A.D. (ca 2001): Th e Relevant/Irrelevant Algorithm Descrip-
tion and Validation Results. Th e Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Labora-
tory.
Krapohl D., McManus B. (1999): An objective method for manually scoring poly-
graph data. Polygraph, 28 (3), 209–222.
Krapohl D., Rosales T. (2014): Decision accuracy for the Relevant-Irrelevant Screen-
ing Test: a partial replication. Polygraph, 41 (1), 20–29.
Krapohl D., Senter S., Stern B. (2005): An exploration of methods for the analysis of 
multiple-issue relevant/irrelevant screening data. Polygraph, 34 (1), 47–61.
Krapohl D.J., Shaw P.K. (2015): Polygraph Screening. In Fundamentals of Poly-
graph Practice. Academic Press, San Diego, CA.
Silver N. (2012): Th e Signal and the Noise: Why so Many Predictions Fail – but 
Some Don’t. Penguin Books, New York.
??????????????????? ??????????????
??????????
Examiner Instructions
Th ank you for volunteering to participate in this project. Th e data provided by you 
and your peers will help us in the development of best practices in polygraph screen-
ing in general, and the Relevant-Irrelevant (RI) Screening Test in particular. All phas-
es of the project will be completed six months, and we hope to have initial analysis 
ready for dissemination by summertime. When the analysis is complete, we will issue 
a formal report of the fi ndings.
Background
Th is study has two parts. In the fi rst part you are asked to analyze 100 sets of RI 
charts collected in a fi eld study in the 1990s. Ground truth was established for each 
of the relevant issues using record checks, urinalysis, and examinee statements. Some, 
none, or all of the cases come from deceptive examinees. Your task will be to make 
a decision for each of the 100 cases of Signifi cant Responses (SR), No Signifi cant 
Responses (NSR) or No Opinion (NO.) 
In about three months we will ask you to look at another sample of RI cases in which 
we will change the instructions of what you need to do. You will make SR, NSR, and 
NO decisions on those cases, too. When this phase is completed we will compare 
the accuracy and reliability of your decisions between the two diff erent parts of the 
study.
Details
Each of the RI cases is in an individual PDF fi le, one chart per page. Sometimes the 
charts were too long to print in a single line, and so they may continue in a diff erent 
line on the same page. Some portions are repeated between the fi rst and second line. 
See below as an example.
?????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???
All cases have three charts, each on a diff erent page. Th e PDF format will allow you 
to enlarge or reduce the size of the tracings to your preference. 
All relevant questions are marked fi rst with an R, then with a number. In most cases 
they will be R1, R2, R3 and R4. Sometimes examinees made admissions that re-
quired modifi cations of the relevant questions. Th e modifi ed relevant questions have 
the letter H at the end of the label, e.g., R1H, R4H, etc. 
Irrelevant questions are denoted by a single letter, e.g., A, B, and C. All other labels 
indicate technical questions, such as T2, R*C2, and I*C2, which are designed to 
ensure the examinee is capable of responding. Th ey are not comparison questions, 
and should not be used in that manner.
In virtually every case there are four presentations of each relevant question. Some 
have only three, and others may have as many as fi ve.
On the Decision Sheet are the numbers 1-100, each of the numbers representing one 
of the RI cases in the study. Th e case numbers are in the PDF fi le label. You should 
ignore the case notation in the charts themselves. Simply write your decision for the 
100 cases as SR, NSR or NO. 
??????????????????? ??????????????
Your Rights
Th is study relies on volunteers. You do not have to volunteer, and if you do volun-
teer, you have no obligation to fi nish the study. 
You also are ensured confi dentiality. Volunteers will be assigned a number that they 
will use on the score sheets that only you and I (Don Krapohl) will know. When 
the study is completed, I will send you, and only you, your individual results. Th ere 
will be no reports that show which data came from which volunteer. Data will an-
onymised or aggregated in the report submitted for publication.
Th e benefi t to you for participating in this study is that you will receive feedback on 
your accuracy and reliability in the evaluation of RI screening cases. You will also 
know that your data were important in the development of best practices in poly-
graph screening.
Your Responsibilities
Our research project requires each examiner to work independently of the other ex-
aminers. Th is means we ask that you not share any information with other volunteers 
for six months, or when the study is completed. After that time you will be free to 
discuss whatever you wish without risking the study data.
Also, please remember that accuracy is more important than speed. We have desig-
nated 30 days for the volunteers to complete the analysis of the data, but if you fi nd 
you need additional time it will be given to you.
Contact Information
If you have any comments or questions, please call me at XXX, or via email at XXX 
(deleted for this publication). 
